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Abstract 
Wireless sensor networks consist of number of small, low power nodes with limited computational capabilities. In such networks, 
data is collected from various low power nodes by nodes with higher energy than others, called cluster heads. These cluster heads 
then send this data to a major node called sink. However, this aggregation is prone to many attacks. This paper intends to present 
a study of the algorithms, protocols and techniques for secure data aggregation in sensor networks. The Hello flood attack is 
explained and a novel algorithm for defense against Hello flood attack is proposed and simulated using Matlab. 
. 
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1. Introduction 
Wireless sensor networks are typically characterized by a large area called as sensing field, consisting of a number 
of standalone entities called the sensor nodes, and a base station or sink, to route the sensed information to the outer 
world [1]. Each of these nodes is restricted in terms of resources such as battery power, memory, computational 
efficiency, bandwidth etc. These nodes are assigned the task of sensing a single or various parameters respective to 
the task. Examples are temperature sensing, battlefield surveillance, bridge health monitoring, health care 
monitoring etc. The process of data gathering needs to be energy efficient in order to preserve the energy and thus 
increase the life span of the sensing nodes. For this purpose, several data aggregation protocols have been 
formulated in the past, to summarize the data and reduce the amount of data transmitted [2]. With more emphasis 
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being given to deploying sensor networks in remote areas to transmit confidential information, the security related 
issues need to be given equal importance as energy efficiency. Security protocols are designed to be task specific or 
attack specific. In cluster based aggregation, a more favorable approach is used wherein the entire network is 
divided into clusters [3]. A cluster head is elected for each cluster and it performs the task of data aggregation 
among the cluster. Each cluster head then transmits this aggregated information to the base station. In this approach, 
the number of hops in transmitting the data is reduced, but energy constraint is a restriction. With increase in 
intrusion of secure networks, a mechanism to protect the network from external attacks needs to be developed. In 
this paper we have proposed a novel algorithm to detect a Hello flood attack launched on a wireless sensor network, 
by an external attacker. The rest of the paper is arranged as follows: 
Section 2 discusses the attacks on sensor networks and the security requirements. Section 3 gives a detail account of 
the Hello flood attack and previously proposed solutions to counter the attack. Section 4 gives details of the 
proposed algorithm. Section 5 shows the simulation results. The future scope is discussed in section 6 and 
conclusion in section 7. 
2. Security in sensor networks 
In this section, we discuss the major possible attacks on sensor networks and the security requirements that should 
be met, in order to avoid these attacks [4], [5], [6], [7]. 
2.1 Attacks on sensor networks 
 
2.1.1. Denial of Service attack (DoS): It is a form of attack in which a node captured by an external attacker, denies 
providing service to the network. 
2.1.2 Selective Forwarding Attack: In this type of attack, the infected node refuses to forward a particular message. 
All neighbours are blocked from forwarding the particular message. Then, a target node is selected and messages are 
flooded to the target node. 
2.1.3. Sinkhole Attack: In sinkhole attack, the attacker node acts as a sinkhole by attracting all the traffic to a certain 
area of the network by compromising a certain node. 
2.1.4. Sybil Attack: In Sybil attack, a node assumes multiple identities to confuse other nodes. Sybil attacks mostly 
possess threat to geographic routing protocols. 
2.1.5. Wormhole attack: Here, an attacker builds a virtual tunnel and routes traffic through it, thus bypassing the rest 
of the nodes. 
2.1.6. Hello flood attack: In this attack, a high energy attacker, causes ordinary nodes to lose energy by making them 
transmit at a large distance with high energy. 
 
2.2 Security requirements of sensor networks [8],[9],[10] 
2.2.1. Data confidentiality: Data confidentiality ensures that secrecy of sensed data is never disclosed to 
unauthorized entities. The standard approach for keeping important data secret is to encrypt the data with a secret 
key that only intended receivers possess, hence achieving confidentiality.  
2.2.2. Data integrity and freshness: Data integrity guarantees that a message being transferred is never corrupted. 
Data freshness protects data aggregation schemes against replay attacks by ensuring that the transmitted data is 
recent. 
2.2.3. Source authentication: Source authentication enables a sensor node to ensure the identity of the peer node it is 
communicating with. An adversary could masquerade a node, thus gaining unauthorized access to resource and 
sensitive information and interfering with the operation of other nodes. 
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2.2.4. Availability: Availability guarantees the survivability of network services against Denial-of-Service (DoS) 
attacks. Since data aggregators collect the data of a number of sensor nodes and sends the aggregated data to the 
base station, availability of data aggregators is more important than regular sensor nodes. 
3.  The Hello Flood attack 
3.1 The concept of Hello message 
     The Hello flood attack is a network layer attack [2]. It targets the routing protocols that require nodes to 
broadcast the Hello packets to announce their presence to their neighbors. A node that receives such a packet, from a 
node, assumes that this node is in its own vicinity. A high energy outsider attacker may send Hello packets to the 
nodes in the field, creating an impression that it is within the radio range of the nodes. Thus, these ordinary nodes 
make attempts to communicate to the attacker assuming that it is its neighbor, and lose a significantly high amount 
of energy. The network is left in a state of confusion and chaos. It is hence, necessary to detect the presence of such 
a high energy attacker and isolate it [11],[12]. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Hello flood attack in WSN [2] 
 
3.2 Defence against hello flood attack 
 
     An extensive survey on protocols and techniques used to detect the hello flood attack has been presented in [9]. 
The authors have classified these techniques in cryptographic and non-cryptographic approaches. However, due to 
high energy, time, and memory requirements of the cryptographic methods, we have preferred to discuss the non-
cryptographic methods prominently. These are given below: 
x In [13], Waldir et al. had proposed a signal strength based detection of Hello flood attack. The mechanism 
was such that, if a node was suspected to be an adversary, all the surrounding nodes, within its radio range 
would test the received signal strength (RSS) from that node and, vote for it either as suspicious or non-
suspicious. If the suspicious count for a particular node was full, it was marked as suspicious. 
x In [14], Virendra et al. have proposed the signal strength based approach for detection of malicious node. 
However, the disadvantage of this approach is the transmission of test packet if any node is suspected to be 
malicious. This increases the bit overhead extensively.  
x In [15], Magotra et al. have improvised this approach and based the decision of detection of malicious on 
signal strength as well as distance between the nodes. However, if both these parameters cross a certain 
threshold, the test packet scenario again comes into picture, thus increasing the overhead. 
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3.3 The Leach protocol 
      Since the attack simulation presented in this report, is based on Leach protocol, a brief account of basics of this 
protocol is being presented. Heinzelman, et.al [1] introduced a hierarchical clustering algorithm for sensor networks, 
called Low Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy (LEACH). LEACH arranges the nodes in the network into small 
clusters and chooses one of them as the cluster-head. Node first senses its target and then sends the relevant 
information to its cluster-head. Then the cluster head aggregates and compresses the information received from all 
the nodes and sends it to the base station. 
LEACH operations can be divided into two phases:- 
 
1. Setup phase: - During the setup phase, a predetermined fraction of nodes, p, choose themselves as cluster-
heads. This is done according to a threshold value, T(n). The threshold value depends upon the desired 
percentage to become a cluster-head- p, the current round r, and the set of nodes that have not become the 
cluster-head in the last 1/p rounds, which is denoted by G. The formula is as follows: 
 
                      ܶሺ݊ሻ ൌ ൝
௣
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   if nאG
Ͳ                 else
                                                                                                           (1) 
 
2. Steady phase :-During the steady phase, the sensor nodes i.e. the non-cluster head nodes starts sensing data         
and sends it to their cluster-head according to the TDMA schedule. The cluster-head node, after receiving 
data from all the member nodes, aggregates it and then sends it to the base-station. 
 
 
4.  The proposed algorithm 
     We consider that in a wireless sensor network that follows a clustering approach, the non-Cluster Head (CH) 
nodes along with comparing the RSS of receiving HELLO packet also compare the distance between the non-CH 
node and elected CH node with the Distance threshold [10]. Thus, only those nodes whose RSS as well as distance 
are within threshold limits are considered for joining CH. For this, we assume that every node has its location 
information and during the Setup phase of LEACH protocol, when advertisement of “HELLO” packets is done by 
CH, it sends its location coordinates also. Now, the nodes receiving HELLO packets from CH calculates the 
distance between as shown in (2). 
Dist = sqrt[sq(xch-x1) + sq(ych-y1)]                                                                                                                         (2) 
Here, (x1,y1) are location coordinates of node receiving packet and (xch,ych) are location coordinates of CH sent 
through advertising HELLO packet. Receiving Node also calculates threshold value for RSS (Rthresh) which 
corresponds to the radio range of each node in the network and threshold value for distance (Dthresh) which 
corresponds to the distance covered through radio range. After this, each node decides to join a CH based on RSS of 
receiving packet & distance calculated. For each non-CH node, If RSS < Rthresh & Dist < Dthresh, then CH Node 
=‘Friend’ otherwise the node is classified as suspicious. If all the nodes that are within the radio range of the CH , 
classify it as suspicious, a variable called ‘blacklist’ is incremented. Further the node ‘blacklisted’ as suspicious is 
then isolated and no more packets are received from that particular node by any other node. Let N be a normal node 
that receives an advertisement from Cluster head Cl. Here, ! indicates unicast i.e node N decides to join Cl. 
 
Algorithm for simulation is given below: 
1. N< = Cl : id (Cl) , join Adv, (xch, ych) 
2. N: Dist= sqrt[sq(xch-x1) + sq(ych-y1)] 
3. If RSS < Rthresh && if Dist<Dthresh, 
    then N(i) ! Cl (j): id (N (i)), id (Cl (j)), join req 
4. Else add Cl into suspicious list. 
5. If all nodes in radio range of Cl mark it as suspicious, increment variable blacklist. 
6. Isolate location of Cl i.e. node at location (xch, ych). 
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5.  Simulations and results 
Assumptions: All nodes have complete knowledge of their location. Matlab (version 7.8) simulator has been used 
for simulation purpose. A square area of 100m × 100m is considered for simulation experiments. The network 
topology consists of 100 nodes. Initially, the nodes are randomly placed in fixed position. 10% of total number of 
nodes may have high transmission, receiving and carrier sensing power; one node is a base station. Various 
parameters taken for simulation and their values are given in Table below 
Table 1: Parameters used for simulation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1. LEACH protocol after simulation: 
 
Figure 2 shows the simulation of basic Leach protocol. The network consists of hundred nodes spread around in 
100mx100m area.  Depending on Received Signal Strength (RSS), clusters are formed. Each cluster has its own 
cluster head. 
.  
Fig.2. Initial scenario after setup phase 
5.2 With one external attacker launching Hello flood attack: 
 
Fig. 3.   Single external attacker launching a Hello flood attack 
Parameter Used Values  
Field Dimensions  100x100 (metres)  
No. of nodes in the field  100  
Optimal election 
probability  
0.1  
ETX & ERX  50 nJ  
No. of rounds  100-5000  
Message size  4000 bits  
Initial energy of each node 0.5 J  
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Figure 3 shows how an external attacker at location (115,175) launches a Hello flood attack on the 100x100 m2 
WSN. The red ‘+’ sign indicated the fake co-ordinates that the attacker creates in the WSN to confuse the adjacent 
nodes. The above mentioned algorithm is followed and the result is: i) the value of the variable ‘blacklist’ is 1 
indicating presence of 1 malicious node. ii) The original co-ordinates of the fake location are displayed correctly. 
 
5.3 Varying the location of external attacker [15]: 
      Initially, the location co-ordinates of external attacker were chosen such that it was far away from the sensor 
field (115,175), at a diagonal distance of nearly 95 m. A further analysis by reducing the diagonal distance is 
performed and the results are tabulated in table 2. From Table 2, it is clear that as the attacker node moves closer to 
the fields, the nodes lose high amount of energy due to high energy reception .The nodes die out faster. 1000 rounds 
were simulated for each position. 
 
Table 2. Analysis of dead nodes according to proximity of attacker (single attacker) 
Approximate diagonal 
distance of attacker      
from the field 
(meters) 
First node dead at round 
number 
95 545 
60 443 
43 417 
 
 
5.4 With 2 external attackers launching Hello flood attack: 
Figure 4 shows two attackers launching hello flood attack on the WSN. 
The results of software simulation were: 
i) The value of the variable ‘blacklist’ is 2 indicating presence of 2 malicious nodes. 
ii) The original co-ordinates of the fake location are displayed correctly. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Two external attackers launching a Hello flood attack 
 
 
With increase in number of attackers, the total number of packets forwarded and ultimately, the total energy spent in 
the network increases and thus the statistics of dead nodes changes as per the table shown below: 
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Table 3. With single external attacker 
No. of rounds First node 
dead at round 
no: 
Total no. of 
dead nodes 
Simulation 
time 
(seconds) 
100  - - 12 
200 - - 24 
300 - - 36 
400 - - 48 
500 - - 60 
600 545 43 72 
700 551 78 84 
800 553 95 96 
 
Table 4.   With two external attackers 
 
No. of rounds First node 
dead at round 
no: 
Total no. of 
dead nodes 
Simulation 
time 
(seconds) 
100 - - 15 
200 - - 30 
300 - - 45 
400 - - 60 
500 413 63 75 
600 421 79 90 
700 428 95 105 
800  95 120 
 
6. Future Scope 
 
     The proposed algorithm was successful in isolating the external attacker. However, a more detailed analysis of 
the algorithm needs to be performed. Comparison of the execution time of the algorithm, with the test packet time 
approach can be conducted and a further estimation of energy efficiency needs to be made. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
     In data aggregation, the general approach is to jointly process the data generated by different sensor nodes while 
being forwarded toward the base station. This report provides an introduction of the concept of data aggregation and 
its classification in brief. This is followed by the review of secure data aggregation concept in wireless sensor 
networks. To give the motivation behind secure data aggregation, first, the security requirements of wireless sensor 
networks are presented and several techniques and protocols for secure data aggregation are explained in brief. 
Second, a simulation of Hello flood attack is performed with one and two external attackers and the blacklisting 
technique to detect the presence of malicious node is analyzed and found to be successful in detection. 
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